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In 2013 the Western Cape legislature passed the Western Cape Community Safety Act (WCCSA) to 
improve monitoring of and oversight over the police. One creation of the WCCSA is the Western Cape 
Police Ombudsman, which became operational in 2015. This article reviews its history and context, as 
well as results from its first year. The Police Ombudsman, the only one in the country, must be seen as 
one of the results of efforts by the opposition-held province to carve out more powers in the narrowly 
defined constitutional space, and in so doing to exercise more effective oversight and monitoring 
of police performance, and improve police–community relations. The Ombudsman must also be 
seen against the backdrop of poor police–community relations in Cape Town and the subsequent 
establishment of a provincial commission of inquiry into the problem, a move that was opposed by the 
national government, contesting its constitutionality. Results from the Ombudsman’s first 18 months in 
operation are modest, but there are promising signs. Nonetheless, the office is small and it did not do 
itself any favours by not complying with its legally mandated reporting requirements. 
In South Africa, the powers that provincial 
governments hold over the South African Police 
Service (SAPS), a national competency, were 
reduced from what was contained in the Interim 
Constitution (1993) to the Constitution, which 
was promulgated in 1996.1 Under the Interim 
Constitution, the SAPS functioned ‘under the 
direction of the national government as well as 
the various provincial governments’,2 reflecting 
a dual responsibility with devolved authority. 
Provincial authority over the SAPS has now 
been reduced from provinces being responsible 
for ‘directing’ with national government, to 
the current situation which sees them with 
‘monitoring, overseeing and liaising’ functions 
set out in section 206(3) of the Constitution. 
There is therefore a centralisation of authority in 
national government. 
In 2009 the Democratic Alliance (DA) assumed 
power in the Western Cape, taking over from 
the African National Congress (ANC), making 
the Western Cape the only opposition-held 
province in the country. Since 2011 the 
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Western Cape government has commenced 
with a number of initiatives to address 
crime and safety, such as provincial safety 
legislation and monitoring work done by the 
provincial department of community safety. 
These initiatives were aimed at improving the 
monitoring of police performance in order to 
bring about greater accountability and address 
the quality of policing. Specifically, these 
mechanisms have been aimed at exploring 
and utilising constitutionally mandated powers 
with reference to ‘monitoring, overseeing and 
liaising functions’, limited as they may be, with 
reference to the SAPS. The appointment of the 
Khayelitsha Commission in 2012 to investigate 
the breakdown of police–community relations in 
that township,3 and the passing of the Western 
Cape Community Safety Act4 (WCCSA) in 2013 
were significant developments in this regard, 
and are seen as attempts to push back the 
centralised control over police performance.
The Khayelitsha Commission was established 
by the Premier of the Western Cape to 
investigate allegations of inefficiency at 
the three Khayelitsha police stations and 
allegations that there had been a breakdown 
in the relationship between the community and 
the police.5 The commission found that there 
were indeed a range of deep-seated problems 
relating to inefficiencies in the police, under-
investigation of reported crimes and poor 
general management in the police, to name but 
a few. Dissatisfied with the quality of policing in 
the province, the provincial legislature passed 
the WCCSA to strengthen, among others, the 
provincial government’s oversight role over the 
SAPS. In doing so it explored the limited space 
offered by the Constitution to strengthen police 
accountability and improve police performance 
in respect of crime and safety in the province.
The WCCSA created, among others, 
the Western Cape Police Ombudsman 
(Ombudsman), a complaints mechanism 
accessible to the general public that became 
operational at the end of 2015. It is the only one 
of its kind in the country. Evaluated against the 
history of police oversight in South Africa after 
1994, this article investigates the establishment 
of the Ombudsman and its performance since 
its inception. 
The establishment of an independent police 
investigative mechanism was a requirement set 
in the Interim Constitution6 and subsequently in 
the Constitution,7 and was operationalised by 
the SAPS Act of 1995 with the establishment 
of the Independent Complaints Directorate 
(ICD).8 The ICD was created before the 1996 
Constitution was finalised and operational 
problems soon became evident. A review of 
the ICD was therefore necessary. An important 
contextual development occurred at national 
level in 2012 when the ICD metamorphosed 
into the Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate (IPID),9 with a much more restricted 
scope. Although endowed with more powers, 
IPID was closed off as a general complaints 
mechanism, as it now focuses only on serious 
crimes implicating the police. Where the ICD 
could investigate ‘any misconduct or offence 
allegedly committed’ by a police official,10 
IPID is restricted to a list of serious offences.11 
Moreover, neither body’s mandates dealt with 
police–community relations, an issue that 
became increasingly problematic in the Western 
Cape, as it was unclear where the public would 
go with less serious complaints. One possibility 
is the Civilian Secretariat for Police Services 
(CSPS), but the objects clause of its governing 
legislation excludes it from functioning as an 
explicit complaints mechanism, although it 
does have objects relating to stakeholder 
engagement and strengthening oversight.12 
Moreover, as an advisory body to the Minister of 
Police, it cannot be regarded as independent.
The Ombudsman’s establishment should be 
seen as part of the Western Cape government’s 
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efforts to address crime and safety concerns. 
Crime and safety concerns in the Western Cape 
were, and continue to be, strongly influenced 
by the findings of the Khayelitsha Commission, 
which placed community–police relations and 
police inefficiency on centre stage. The case 
currently before the Equality Court, concerning 
the discrimination in the distribution of police 
resources against poor and black areas in Cape 
Town, is illustrative of this continuing focus,13 
as questions around the equitable allocation of 
police resources were a key finding from the 
Khayelitsha Commission.14 
The following section provides more information 
on the policing context in the Western Cape, 
followed by a discussion of the legal framework 
that gave rise to the Ombudsman. This is 
followed by a description of the power of 
the Ombudsman and an evaluation of its 
performance since its establishment. The article 
concludes with an assessment of its future 
prospects and challenges. 
Context of policing in the province
The Khayelitsha Commission clearly placed 
the quality of policing in the Western Cape 
on the political agenda. National government 
unsuccessfully attempted to block the 
establishment of the commission, first in the 
Cape High Court and later in the Constitutional 
Court.15 The establishment of the Khayelitsha 
Commission was preceded by numerous 
attempts by the Western Cape government, 
starting in November 2011, to engage the 
national government on a range of problems 
with policing in Khayelitsha as identified by a 
group of non-governmental organisations.16 
These efforts did not have the desired effect 
and in August 2012 the commission was 
appointed, although activities were delayed for 
nearly a year while the constitutional challenge 
brought by the Minister of Police was finalised.17 
While the litigation around the Khayelitsha 
Commission attracted significant attention, 
the passing, in April 2013, of the WCCSA took 
place with relatively little attention from the 
media and national government, although it 
was rumoured at one stage that this was also 
heading for the Constitutional Court with then 
Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, threatening 
to challenge its constitutionality.18 
The developments in the opposition-held 
Western Cape at provincial level as well as 
metro level must be viewed as an attempt by 
that provincial government to roll back the highly 
centralised nature of policing in the country.19 
Seen historically, the centralisation of policing 
was on the one hand motivated by a need 
to bring the various homeland police forces 
and the South African Police under central 
control, but also by a fear that regional militias 
and armies might arise out of the transition to 
democracy.20 In recent years there have also 
been calls from the ANC, and proposed as 
such in the White Paper on Policing, that the 
metro police services should also come under 
SAPS control; however, this proposal has met 
strong resistance.21 
The Western Cape, and specifically the Cape 
Metropole, have a particularly serious violent 
crime problem. For example, from 2010 to 
2016 murder increased by 47% and car 
hijacking by 382%.22 With the SAPS evidently 
failing to meet safety and security needs, the 
Western Cape government embarked on a 
different strategy by passing its own legislation 
from which community-based initiatives and 
new structures flowed, placing the emphasis 
on greater transparency and accountability 
through concerted monitoring. It is evident 
that the Western Cape’s DA-led government 
is not satisfied with the quality of policing, and 
it has been progressive in exploring the legal 
avenues available to it in the Constitution. The 
establishment of the Khayelitsha Commission 
and the passing of the WCCSA are examples 
of these efforts. Another unique outflow of this 
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process of constitutional exploration is the 
establishment of the Ombudsman.
Western Cape Constitution
The Western Cape Constitution came into effect 
on 16 January 1998 and granted the provincial 
government powers derived verbatim from the 
Constitution23 in respect of oversight over the 
police, namely:
•  To monitor police conduct
•  To assess the effectiveness of visible policing
•  To oversee the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the police service, including receiving reports 
on the police service
•  To promote good relations between the police 
and the community
•  To liaise with the national cabinet member 
responsible for policing with respect to crime 
and policing in the Western Cape
The Western Cape government may also 
investigate, or appoint a commission of inquiry 
into, any complaints of police inefficiency 
or a breakdown in relations between the 
police and any community; and must make 
recommendations to the national cabinet 
member responsible for policing.24 While 
the provincial government cannot instruct 
the police what to do, it can oversee and 
monitor performance with specific reference 
to police inefficiency and a breakdown in 
police–community relations, and bring this to 
the attention of the Minister of Police. Despite 
several provisions in the Constitution that 
facilitate cooperation between the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government,25 
it was indeed the failings of the relationship 
between the national and provincial spheres 
that gave rise to the establishment of the 
Khayelitsha Commission – a route borne out of 
frustration with the lack of cooperation between 
the two levels.
Western Cape Community Safety Act 
(Act 3 of 2013) 
The notion of an Ombudsman is, of course, not 
new. Post-1994 the Constitution created the 
Office of the Public Protector, preceded by the 
Office of the Ombudsman established in 1991.26 
Other forms of this office have also come into 
being domestically in the private sector (e.g. 
Short Term Insurance Ombudsman)27 as well 
as other cross-cutting spheres (e.g. Health 
Ombudsman).28 There is also no universal 
definition of what an Ombudsman is, but Carl, 
in her taxonomy of public sector ombudsman 
institutions, proposes the following:
An ombudsman is a public sector institution 
which, for the purpose of the protection 
of individual rights and the defence of the 
fundamental rights of democracy such as 
civil and human rights, is authorized by 
a parliament, a ministry or a subdivision 
thereof (legal foundation) to investigate 
independently both own-motion as well as 
complaints from citizens about an alleged 
part of the administration’s/executive’s 
acts, omissions, improprieties, and broader 
systemic problems, and whose only 
tools – due to not being invested with any 
executive power – are its own personal 
authority, recommendations, annual and 
special reports and the media.29
Section 67(1) of the Western Cape Constitution 
empowers the province to pass any legislation 
to carry out the functions listed in section 66(1) 
of the Constitution, which include the police 
monitoring and related functions. Section 3 of 
the WCCSA mandates the provincial Minister 
for Community Safety to exercise a fairly broad 
range of powers centring on three main foci: 
monitoring police performance; overseeing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the police; 
and building good relations between the police 
and other stakeholders. Section 3(l) of the 
WCCSA mandates the provincial Minister to 
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‘record complaints relating to police inefficiency 
or a breakdown of relations between the 
police and the community’. The recording 
of complaints is understood to fall under 
the provincial Minister’s broader mandate to 
build good relations between the police and 
the community, although it may equally be 
regarded as part of its monitoring function. It is 
consequently section 3(l) of the WCCSA, read 
with sections 66(1) and 67(1) of the Western 
Cape Constitution, that gave rise to the 
Ombudsman. Even though the creation in law 
of the Ombudsman preceded the Khayelitsha 
Commission finalising its work, there was 
already sufficient information in the public 
domain on poor police–community relations and 
police inefficiencies to justify its creation. 
The Ombudsman in the WCCSA
The WCCSA mandates the Premier to appoint 
the Ombudsman after consultation with the 
provincial Minister, the Provincial Commissioner 
of Police and the executive heads of municipal 
police services. The appointment is further 
subject to approval by the provincial parliament’s 
standing committee responsible for community 
safety by a resolution adopted in accordance 
with its rules.30 The only requirement is that 
the Ombudsman must be a suitably qualified 
person with experience in law or policing. 
Unlike the Public Protector, the Ombudsman 
does not need a minimum number of years of 
experience or have specified qualifications.31 
The Ombudsman is further appointed for a 
non-renewable term of five years. The Premier 
may remove the Ombudsman from office for 
good cause after consultation with the provincial 
Minister, the Provincial Commissioner of Police 
and the executive heads of municipal police 
services. Again, this is subject to approval by 
the provincial parliament’s standing committee 
responsible for community safety by a resolution 
adopted in accordance with its rules. The 
committee may recommend the removal of 
the Ombudsman from office on the grounds of 
misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence, after 
affording him or her a reasonable opportunity 
to be heard.32 The Ombudsman and staff 
members of the office are also obliged to serve 
independently and impartially, and perform their 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice.33 
The Ombudsman’s budget is voted on by the 
provincial parliament as part of the budget 
of the Department of Community Safety.34 
Being part of the departmental budget may 
impact on the Ombudsman’s independence, 
as has been noted in respect of the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services.35 The 
difference is, however, that the Ombudsman 
does not oversee the department it receives 
its budget from, but is instead funded through 
a department that is part of the monitoring 
and oversight architecture over the SAPS 
in the province. The Ombudsman may also 
be assisted by a person whose service the 
Ombudsman requires for the purpose of a 
particular investigation.36 The first Ombudsman, 
Adv. Vusi Pikoli, was appointed on 1 December 
2014 and 2015/16 was its first full financial year, 
during which it was allocated a budget of just 
below R7 million.37
Powers of the Ombudsman
The central function of the Ombudsman is 
to ‘receive and … investigate complaints 
submitted in terms of section 16, regarding 
inefficiency of the police or a breakdown 
in relations between the police and any 
community’.38 It is therefore a reactive 
mechanism and does not have the power 
to investigate of its own volition, unlike the 
Inspecting Judge for Correctional Services39 
or the Public Protector.40 In order to resolve a 
complaint, if it is not manifestly frivolous, the 
Ombudsman has a number of avenues open 
to him or her. The first, and assuming there is 
sufficient information, is to refer the complaint 
to a more appropriate and competent authority, 
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which may be a national authority, community-
policing forum (CPF), a constitutional authority 
or provincial authority. Second, if the complaint 
is deemed to be of a serious nature or it may be 
dealt with more appropriately by a commission 
of inquiry, a recommendation to this effect may 
be made to the Premier. Third, the Ombudsman 
may decide to investigate the complaint.41 
In order to conduct an investigation, the Act 
affords the Ombudsman two broad powers 
established under section 18 of the Act:42 
18(1) The Ombudsman may direct any 
person to submit an affidavit or affirmed 
declaration or to appear before him or 
her to give evidence or to produce any 
document in that person’s possession 
or under his or her control which has a 
bearing on the matter being investigated, 
and may question that person thereon. 
18(2) The Ombudsman may request an 
explanation from any person whom he 
or she reasonably suspects of having 
information which has a bearing on the 
matter being investigated or to 
be investigated. 
The regulations to the Act bolster these powers 
further by adding that the Ombudsman may 
have meetings with affected persons who may 
have information relevant to the complaint; 
conduct research; conduct inspections in 
loco; and administer surveys.43 Further, the 
regulations also provide that the Ombudsman 
may engage in negotiations and conciliation 
if necessary.44 Unlike a judicial commission of 
inquiry (e.g. the Khayelitsha Commission) the 
Ombudsman does not have the explicit power 
to subpoena, and a number of mechanisms are 
included to ensure cooperation. The strongest 
of these is the provision that if a person fails to 
cooperate, fails to answer questions, provides 
false information, or hinders or obstructs the 
Ombudsman’s investigation, such a person 
is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period of up to three years.45 
Further, failure by a police official or any other 
state official to cooperate must be reported 
to the Provincial Commissioner, executive 
head of the relevant municipal police, as the 
case may be, and the provincial Minister.46 
If, upon completion of an investigation, the 
matter cannot be resolved, the Ombudsman 
must submit his recommendation to the 
provincial Minister and inform the complainant 
accordingly. The provincial Minister must make 
a recommendation to the Minister of Police on 
any investigated complaints that could not be 
resolved by the Ombudsman, and inform the 
complainant accordingly.47
It is apparent that the recommendations from 
the Ombudsman do not have binding power 
on the provincial commissioner, as there is 
no constitutional basis for such power and 
the provincial commissioner takes instruction 
from the national commissioner and not the 
provincial government. The Ombudsman also 
does not have remedial powers, unlike the 
Public Protector.48 This is, however, not to say 
that the recommendations of the Ombudsman 
are without power or authority. That power is 
not in a direct relationship with the provincial 
commissioner, but rather through the 
provincial Minister and ultimately the provincial 
parliament. The provincial Minister must make 
a recommendation to the national Minister 
on investigated complaints that could not be 
resolved by the Ombudsman.49 
The provincial legislature and executive therefore 
hold considerable authority over the provincial 
commissioner once it becomes apparent that 
recommendations from the Ombudsman are 
ignored or good reasons are not provided 
for not implementing them. The provincial 
commissioner must, on a regular basis, report 
to the provincial parliament on a number of 
predetermined issues, as well as on any other 
matter that the provincial parliament may 
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request.50 It should further be borne in mind that 
the provincial commissioner is appointed by the 
national commissioner with the concurrence 
of the provincial executive, and a special 
relationship therefore exists between the two 
parties.51 It is therefore indeed possible that 
the provincial parliament can place significant 
pressure on the provincial commissioner. Read 
together, the Constitution, Western Cape 
Constitution and the WCCSA provide for the 
provincial parliament, if it has lost confidence in 
the provincial commissioner, to call him or her to 
appear before it or any of its committees, prior 
to starting disciplinary action or proceedings for 
his or her dismissal or transfer.52 
In an opposition-held province, the provincial 
executive and legislature are far more likely 
to thoroughly utilise this oversight function 
to bring about an improvement in crime and 
safety, and the Ombudsman forms part of 
this dispensation. For example, by 2016 the 
provincial Department of Community Safety 
was monitoring 25 courts in order to identify 
police inefficiencies in criminal investigations 
and docket management.53 The Department 
of Community Safety has also established a 
police complaints centre to deal with service 
delivery complaints – a further initiative to deal 
with poor police community relations and 
improve accountability.54 That the Western Cape 
has moved in this direction and has brought 
oversight to provincial level through law reform is 
at least in part motivated by frustration with the 
current centralised nature of policing, where the 
Western Cape provincial Minister of Community 
Safety has to compete with eight other 
provincial ministers for the national Minister’s ear 
at Ministers and Members of Executive Councils 
(MINMEC) meetings.55 Crime and safety in the 
Western Cape has certain unique features (e.g. 
gangsterism on the Cape Flats) and requires a 
more tailored response from the SAPS, but that 
has not been forthcoming in recent years. The 
Ombudsman’s power and authority is therefore 
highly dependent on an effective provincial 
government taking its oversight responsibilities 
seriously. A provincial government that is 
tardy in overseeing the police would probably 
render the Ombudsman obsolete. Should 
the Western Cape revert to ANC control, it 
may hold significant consequences for police 
oversight and monitoring, including the role 
and authority of the Ombudsman. The current 
situation of natural tension between the national 
government and an opposition-held province, a 
result of normal democratic processes, is indeed 
beneficial for police accountability. 
Achievements and performance
The WCCSA requires the Ombudsman to 
report annually to the MEC on the number 
of complaints investigated; the number of 
complaints determined to be manifestly frivolous 
or vexatious; the outcome of investigations 
into the complaints; and the recommendations 
regarding the investigated complaints.56 
According to its annual report, from 1 December 
2014 until the end of the 2015/16 financial 
year, the Ombudsman received 399 complaints 
across seven categories as indicated in Figure 1, 
with ‘unacceptable behaviour’ being the highest 
at 114 complaints. The annual report does 
not define or give examples of ‘unacceptable 
behaviour’. Figure 2 shows the number of 
complaints received per month from January 
2015 to March 2016, indicating a steady 
increase in the number of complaints received 
over the period. 
This data points to modest beginnings indeed, 
if we bear in mind there are 150 police stations 
in the province, 18 020 police officials,57 and a 
population of 6.2 million people.58 
As noted already, the Ombudsman received 
399 complaints in its first year and the actions 
taken on these are reflected in Table 1.59 Nearly 
80% of complaints were investigated, but only 
17% resulted in a report. This may be a result of 
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investigations taking unexpectedly long, which 
may mean that some cases will be carried 
forward to (and reported on in) the next financial 
year. The Ombudsman’s report notes that some 
complaints are dealt with in a matter of days 
but that others require lengthy investigation in 
order to understand the ‘intricacies associated 
with complex issues’.60 The Ombudsman’s 
office has a small staff and only four people are 
dedicated to investigations. This, combined 
with being a new institution that is in the 
process of establishing its work methods, may 
have further contributed to the low proportion of 
reports produced. 
Figure 1: Complaints per category
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Complaints originated from all over the 
province, but the top five areas of origin are 
given in Table 2. It should be noted that in 20 
complaints the area of origin was unknown. 
It is nonetheless encouraging that four of the 
five areas listed in Table 2 are in crime-ridden 
and impoverished Cape Flats communities, 
indicating that there is some measure of trust in 
the Office of the Ombudsman.
the recommendations made to the SAPS.61 
None of these requirements was met in the 
2015/2016 annual report. Subsequent annual 
reports should reflect more closely on steps 
taken by the Ombudsman to improve police–
community relations and, more specifically, 
on how the police have responded and if the 
responses had the desired effect.
Conclusion
The Western Cape, through the WCCSA, is 
pushing for a stronger oversight relationship 
with the SAPS, even though its powers are 
significantly curtailed by the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, it is attempting to make 
policing more closely aligned to the needs 
of the Western Cape and to hold the police 
accountable to the extent possible under 
the Constitution. National government was 
resistant to the Western Cape’s appointment 
of a commission of inquiry into police–
community relations, and made this very 
clear in its opposition to the Khayelitsha 
Commission. While there may have been talk 
of similar opposition to the WCCSA, this did 
not materialise and the Constitutional Court 
has now affirmed that provincial governments 
have a legitimate interest in improved 
policing, and that they can engage in a range 
of functions towards this end, including 
establishing judicial commissions of inquiry. 
The Constitutional Court did not deal with the 
Ombudsman in the Khayelitsha Commission 
case, as it was not raised by either party, but 
since national government has not publicly 
opposed it and the office was established, we 
can conclude that it is now an accepted part 
of the Western Cape oversight architecture 
and the devolution of power. 
Whether other provinces will embark on a 
similar route is probably unlikely as long as 
they are controlled by the same political party 
that controls national government. However, 
it is safe to conclude that policing needs vary 
Category N %
Number of cases investigated 316 79.2
Number of reports on cases 
investigated
69 17.3
Table 1: Cases investigated and reported on
Area Number
Delft 14
Grassy Park 14
Milnerton 11
Mitchells Plain 12
Ocean View 11
Table 2: SAPS stations from most   
 complaints originated
What seems to be lacking from the annual 
report is data giving insight into the impact 
of the Ombudsman; information that would 
reflect in some way whether complaints 
investigations and reports made by the 
Ombudsman have improved police–community 
relations, and if there has been a change 
in police performance. No information is 
provided on how complaints were resolved, 
the nature of recommendations made to 
the SAPS, and what the SAPS’s reaction to 
these complaints was. This lack of detail is 
regrettable as such information may give insight 
into the effectiveness of the Ombudsman. As 
noted above, the WCCSA requires that the 
Ombudsman must report in its annual report on 
the activities under its mandate, including the 
number of investigations, their outcome, and 
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across the provinces and also at local level, 
and for this reason it is necessary to devolve 
oversight accordingly. Even if such oversight 
has a limited mandate, it should contribute to 
addressing current poor police–community 
relations and bring about more accountable and 
responsive policing. The other provinces will 
therefore be wise to monitor how the Western 
Cape approach unfolds over the next three to 
five years. 
The Ombudsman faces a number of significant 
challenges and this should temper expectations 
as to its impact. The office has a tiny budget 
at this stage (some R7 million) and this has 
implications for its capacity to investigate, as well 
as its accessibility to the province’s population. 
The provincial government may review its 
allocation if there is evidence of a high demand 
for its services and that the Ombudsman is 
effective in fulfilling its mandate when intervening. 
A further challenge for the Ombudsman is 
its limited powers regarding police conduct. 
The Ombudsman’s recommendations are not 
binding, and thus it has to rely on moral authority 
and the powers of persuasion. Fortunately, the 
Ombudsman can rely on the provincial executive 
as well as the provincial legislature to apply 
pressure on the police to improve performance, 
although this reliance may be tempered if 
the political dispensation reverts to an ANC-
controlled province. 
With only one office in Cape Town, the 
Ombudsman will have to do a fair amount of 
promotional work to inform the public of its 
functions, and also to report on successes in 
order to build confidence in its independence 
and effectiveness in addressing poor policing 
and poor police–community relations. We 
know very little about how the police regard 
the Ombudsman and its recommendations, 
but it is safe to predict that the relationship will 
likely be strained and that the police will be 
resistant to implementing its recommendations. 
The Ombudsman will need the support of the 
executive to make headway in this regard. 
However, if the SAPS can see the benefits of 
the Ombudsman’s interventions, this will surely 
foster stronger cooperation.
To comment on this article visit 
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